We consider in this paper a networked system of opinion dynamics in continuous time, where the agents are able to evaluate their self-appraisals in a distributed way. In the model we formulate, the underlying network topology is described by a strongly connected graph. For each ordered pair of adjacent agents (i, j), we assign a function of selfappraisal to agent i, which measures the level of importance of agent i to agent j. Thus by communicating only with his neighbors, each agent is able to calculate the difference between his level of importance to others and others' level of importance to him. The dynamical system of self-appraisals is then designed to drive these differences to zero. We show that for almost all initial conditions, the trajectory of the dynamical system asymptotically converges to an equilibrium which is exponentially stable.
I. INTRODUCTION
A social network consists of a group of people and their interactions with their neighbors. The concept of social networks is familiar to most people because of the emergence of online social networking services such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+. Many social behaviors spread through social networks of interacting agents. Examples are opinion dynamics [1] , adoption of new technology or products [2] , voting [3] , and demonstrations [4] . In this paper, we will focus on an important issue in opinion dynamics, which is about how each agent in the social network evaluates his own impact and importance in a distributed way.
Over the past several decades, there has been considerable attention paid to understanding how an agent's opinion evolves over time. In social science, various models have been proposed to capture opinion dynamics. Notable among these are the three classical models: the DeGroot model [1] , the Friedkin-Johnsen model [5] , and the Krause model [6] . In the DeGroot model, each agent has a fixed set of neighbors and takes a convex combination of his own opinion and the opinions of his neighbors. The Friedkin-Johnsen model is a variation of the DeGroot model in which each agent adheres to his initial opinion to a certain degree. The Krause model defines the neighbor sets in a different way; each agent takes those agents whose opinions differ from him by no more than a certain confidence level as his neighbors. It is worth to emphasize that the Krause model is a nonlinear system, while the first two models lead to linear systems. Xudong Recently, with the rapid expansion of large-scale, online networks, there has been an increased interest in the analysis of opinion formation, with the objective of extending the classical models by taking into account more factors of social interactions [7] - [15] . In the work of [7] and [8] , the effects of the existence of stubborn agents-agents who never update their opinions-are investigated in a randomized pair-wise updating process. In [9] , the opinion formation process is reformulated into a local interaction game, and the concept of stubbornness of an agent regarding his initial opinion is introduced. The Krause model and its variations are studied in [10] - [13] . For example, a game-theoretic analysis of the Krause model is studied in [12] . The work of [13] takes into account exogenous factors, such as the influence of media, and assumes that each agent updates his opinion via the opinions of the population inside his "confidence range" and the information from an exogenous input in that range. In the literature, both discrete-time [1] , [5] and continuous-time [16] , [17] approaches have been adopted to model the update rule of opinions of agents.
Recently, Jia et al proposed the so-called DeGroot-Friedkin model [14] , [15] . This model uses the concept of reflected appraisal from sociology [18] , [19] , and captures the evolution of self-confidence, i.e., how confident an agent is about his own opinions on a variety of issues. Briefly speaking, reflected appraisal describes the phenomenon that agents' self-appraisals are influenced by the appraisals of other agents on them. Following the work of [14] , [15] , a modified DeGroot-Friedkin model has been proposed in [20] in which each agent updates its level of self-confidence in a more frequent manner. Specifically, all the agents in the network update their own levels of self-confidence immediately after each time step of discussion, instead of waiting for the opinion process to reach a consensus, which generally takes infinite time. Yet, the analysis of the modified DeGroot-Friedkin model has been carried out only in some special cases.
We introduce in this paper a continuous-time self-appraisal model whereby the agents in a social network are able to evaluate their self-appraisals in a distributed way. For each ordered pair of agents i and j, we assign a function of selfappraisal to agent i, which measures the level of importance of agent i to agent j. With local interactions with his neighbors only, each agent is able to calculate the difference between his level of importance to others and others' level of importance to himself. The proposed dynamical system of self-appraisals aims to drive these differences to zero. We show that for almost all initial conditions, the trajectory of the dynamical system asymptotically converges to an equilibrium which is exponentially stable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe in detail the self-appraisal model, and state the main theorem of the paper. Sections III-V are devoted to the proof of the main theorem. A detailed organization of the proof will be given after the statement of Theorem 1. We provide conclusions in the last section.
II. SELF-APPRAISAL MODEL AND MAIN THEOREM
In this section, we introduce the continuous-time selfappraisal model, and state the main result of this paper.
A. Background and Notations
By convention, the neighbor relationship among the n agents in the network is characterized by a directed graph G = (V, E), with V = {1, . . . , n} the vertex set and E the edge set. Denote by i → j an edge of G in which i is the start-vertex and j is the end-vertex, and we say that j is an outgoing neighbor of i and i is an incoming neighbor of j. Denote by V + i (resp. V − i ) the set of incoming (resp. outgoing) neighbors of i, respectively. A directed path (or simply path) of G is a sequence of edges i 1 → . . . → i k connecting vertices of G, and all the vertices in the path are distinct from each other. We say that G is strongly connected if for any ordered pair of vertices (i, j), there exists a path from i to j.
Let e 1 , . . . , e n be the canonical basis of R n , and denote by Sp[V] the unit simplex in R n :
For an arbitrary dynamical systemẋ = f (x) in R n , a subset Q ⊆ R n is said to be positive invariant if for any initial condition x(0) ∈ Q, the trajectory x(t) remains in Q for all time t ≥ 0.
B. The Self-Appraisal Model
To introduce the self-appraisal model, we first consider the following continuous-time opinion dynamics:
where z i (t) is a real number (or vector) which represents the opinion of agent i on certain ongoing issue at time t. The number x i (t) ∈ [0, 1] represents the current self-appraisal of agent i in the social network. The coefficients c ij 's are positive real numbers, and satisfy the following condition:
We then recognize that system (1) is a continuous-time consensus process [21] , with the dynamics of z i (t) scaled by the non-negative factor (1 − x i (t)). Note that the larger x i (t)
is, the smaller is |ż i (t)|. Thus, (1 − x i (t)) can be viewed as a measure of the total amount of opinions agent i accepts from others at time t, and c ij (1 − x i (t)) is the corresponding portion agent i accepts from agent j. We further assume that c ij ≤ 1/2 for all i → j ∈ E, which implies that when agent i takes opinions from his neighbors, there is no agent whose opinion dominates over all the others.
With the consensus process in mind, we propose the following dynamics for the self-appraisals x i :
d dt
We assume that the self-appraisals are scaled so that they sum to one, i.e., x :
. We will show in the next section that Sp[V] is a positive invariant set for system (2) . Thus, this scaling is effective along the evolution. We now justify the self-appraisal model introduced above. From (2), the evolution of x i is determined by two terms:
Explanations of these two terms are given below.
Each summand c ji (1 − x j )x j in the second term is a product of two factors: one is c ji (1 − x j ) which measures the amount of opinion agent j accepts from agent i during the consensus process (1), and the other factor x j is the selfappraisal of agent j which reflects the importance of agent j in the network. Thus, their product c ji (1 − x j )x j can be viewed as the measure of importance of agent i to agent j. Of course, there are numerous ways of modeling these two factors; the rationale behind the choice of using the product is as follows: First consider the case where x j = 0; then agent j is not important at all in the social network, and thus, agent i will not increase his self-appraisal regardless of how much opinion agent j accepts from him. On the other hand, considering the case where x j = 1, we see from the consensus process that agent j will not accept any opinion from agent i. Thus, in this situation, agent i will not increase his self-appraisal either, regardless of how important agent j is in the network. By taking these two cases into account, we realize that c ji (1 − x j )x j may be one of the simplest expressions that realistically models how the neighbor j affects the self-appraisal of agent i.
The summation ∑ j∈V + i c ji (1 − x j )x j can then be viewed as the aggregate measure of importance of agent i to others. Conversely, in view of the fact that
we can interpret the other term (1 − x i )x i as the measure of importance of others to agent i. Note that by communicating with his incoming neighbors, each agent i is able to compute these two terms by himself.
The self-appraisal model is then designed so that agent i measures the difference of the two terms, and drives it to zero. In particular, note that if x * is an equilibrium of system (2), then for each agent i, we have the balance equation:
In other words, at an equilibrium, the importance of agent i to others is equal to the importance of others to agent i.
C. Main Result
We summarize the key conditions assumed in the remainder of the paper:
is a strongly connected graph, and has at least three vertices. The coefficients
We now state the main result. Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the self-appraisal model (2) has the following properties:
1. The unit simplex Sp[V] is a positive invariant set.
2. There are (n + 1) equilibria of system (2) . Each vertex e i of Sp[V] is an unstable equilibrium. The remaining equilibrium x * satisfies the following condition: Remark 1. Note that for the cascaded system (1)-(2), because of the triangular structure (i.e., (2) feeding into (1) but not the other way around), the convergence of system (2) implies the convergence of the consensus process (1).
The remaining sections are organized to prove Theorem 1. In section III, we focus on some basic properties of system (2) . In particular, we show that the unit simplex is positive invariant, and also, we characterize the equilibria in the simplex. In section IV, we focus on the system behavior around a vertex of the simplex. We show that there is a closed neighborhood around each vertex in the simplex such that if the initial condition is not the vertex, then the trajectory will be away from that neighborhood after a finite amount of time. In section V, we provide a proof of Theorem 1.
III. EQUILIBRIA IN THE SIMPLEX
In this section, we establish some basic properties of system (2) . We first have the following fact: Proposition 1. The unit simplex Sp[V] is positive invariant for system (2) . We first write system (2) into a matrix form. A square matrix is said to be an infinitesimal stochastic matrix if its off-diagonal entries are non-negative and its rows sum to zero. Now, define an infinitesimal stochastic matrix C by specifying its off-diagonal entries: define the ij-th entry of C to be c ij if i → j ∈ E, and 0 otherwise. The diagonal entries of C are then uniquely determined by the condition that the row sum of C is zero. For a vector x in Sp[V], denote by X := diag(x 1 , · · · , x n ) a diagonal matrix. Then, system (2) can be expressed as
Define s(x) := 1 x, with 1 ∈ R n the vector of all ones. Then, using the fact that C 1 = 0, we get
which implies that if x(0) ∈ Sp[V], then s(x(t)) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. Denote the vector field of (3) by
and let f i (x) be the i-th entry of f (x). We establish the following fact:
Proof. This directly follows from (2)
Proposition 1 then follows from (4) and Lemma 1.
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the set of equilibria of system (2) . We first state some facts about the matrix C. Since G is strongly connected and c ij > 0 for all i → j ∈ E, the matrix C has zero as a simple eigenvalue while all the other eigenvalues of C have negative real parts.
Let v be the left-eigenvector of C corresponding to the zero eigenvalue. Scale v such that ∑ n i=1 v i = 1; then all entries of v are positive, and sum to one. Another relevant property of v is the following. Recall that from Assumption 1, we have c ij ≤ 1/2 for all i → j ∈ E, from which it follows that
To see this, note that C v = 0, and hence, v
and hence, v i ≤ 1/3. We now establish the following fact: Proof. It should be clear that each vertex e i is an equilibrium. We will now show that there is only one non-vertex equilibrium, which lies in the interior of Sp[V]. First, note that if x is an equilibrium, then C (I − X)x = 0. Hence, there exists a number µ such that (I − X)x = µv, for v the left eigenvector of C with respect to the zero eigenvalue.
Note that if x is not a vertex, then µ is positive. Later, in Corollary 1, we will see that if x is an equilibrium of system (2), then x i < 1/2. Assuming this fact, we then solve x i (µ) as
It now suffices to show that there is a unique positive µ with the resulting vector x(µ) contained in Sp[V]. Define ψ(µ) := ∑ n i=1 x i (µ), and note that ψ(0) = 0, and moreover, ψ(µ) is strictly monotonically increasing as long as (1 − 4µv i ) remains nonnegative for all i ∈ V. Without loss of generality, assume that v 1 ≥ v i for all i > 1, and let µ 1 := 1/(4v 1 ). We show below that ψ(µ 1 ) > 1. Note that if this holds, then there is a unique µ ∈ (0, µ 1 ) with ψ(µ) = 1, and hence, x(µ) is the unique equilibrium which lies in the interior of Sp[V].
Let w i := v i /v 1 , and note that ψ(µ 1 ) can be expressed as
Now, consider the following optimization problem:
Note that the first constraint 0 ≤ w i ≤ 1 comes from the assumption that 0 ≤ v i ≤ v 1 , and the second constraint ∑ n i=2 w i ≥ 2 follows from (5):
Since the function ∑ n i=2 √ 1 − w i is concave in w i , the maximum is achieved when
Note that from Assumption 1, we have that n ≥ 3, and hence, w i = 2/(n − 1) ≤ 1. With these values of w i , we get
which implies that ψ(µ 1 ) > n/2 − (n − 2)/2 = 1. This completes the proof.
Note that the set of equilibria of system (2) coincides with the set of equilibria of the opinion system studied in [14] , [15] , though with a completely different dynamical system.
IV. VERTICES ARE REPELLERS
In this section, we focus on the system behavior around a vertex of the simplex. In particular, we show that each e i is unstable, and in fact, it is a repeller. To this end, we choose an ∈ (0, 1), and define P i ( ) ⊂ Sp[V] as follows:
We note that each P i ( ) is a closed neighborhood of e i in Sp[V], and further that P i ( ) P i ( ) if < . We now establish the following fact:
Proof. First, apply the condition that c ij ≤ , and obtain
Now, fix the value of x i , and consider the following optimization problem:
Denote by d i the cardinality of V + i . Since G is strongly connected, we have that d i > 0 for all i ∈ V. Note that the function ∑ j∈V + i (1 − x j )x j is concave, and the maximum is achieved when
Combining (7) and (8), we get
For the first term on the right hand side, we have that (1 − /d i ) > 0. For the second term, if x = e i , then (1 − x i ) > 0. For the last term, we define
and get
Combining these facts, we have thus proved that f i (x) < 0, for all x ∈ P i (α i ) − {e i }.
Following Proposition 3, we describe some relevant properties of system (2) . From Assumption 1, we have that c ij ≤ 1/2 for all i → j ∈ E. Now, let = 1/2; then following (9), we get
, and the equality holds if and only if d i = n − 1. Now, define
which is a sharp upper-bound for α i . We will fix α for the rest of the analysis. Now, define a subset Q ⊂ Sp[V] as
Note that Q can be expressed as
where cl(·) denotes the closure of a set in R n . An illustration of Q in the case n = 3 is given in Figure 1 . We next derive some facts as Corollaries of Proposition 3:
Corollary 1. If x is a non-vertex equilibrium of system (2), then x ∈ Q. In particular, 0 < x i < 1/2 for all i ∈ V. Proof.
But since x is not a vertex, by Proposition 3, we have f i (x) < 0. Thus, x can not be an equilibrium if x / ∈ Q.
Corollary 2. The set Q is positive invariant for system (2) . For any initial condition x(0) ∈ Sp[V] other than a vertex, the trajectory x(t) enters Q in finite time.
Proof. We first show that Q is positive invariant. From (12) , it suffices to show that each cl(Sp[V] − P i (α)) is positive invariant. By construction, x i ≤ α if and only if x ∈ cl(Sp[V] − P i (α)). By Proposition 3, we have that f i (x) < 0 for all x ∈ P i (α). It then follows that cl(Sp[V] − P i (α)) is positive invariant. We now show that if x(0) is not a vertex, then there exists an instant T ≥ 0 such that x(t) ∈ Q for all t ≥ T. It suffices to show that for each i ∈ V, there exists an instant
is positive invariant, we can set T i = 0. Now, assume that x i (0) > α. Then, P i (α) P i (x i (0)), and hence,
then the trajectory x(t) enters cl(Sp[V] − P i (α)) in no more than T i units of time. This completes the proof.
V. ON THE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. We first establish the following fact: Proposition 4. Let the initial condition x(0) of system (2) be in Q. Then, the trajectory x(t) converges to the non-vertex equilibrium x * ∈ Q.
Proof. Define variables y i as
Note that each y i is well-defined because 0 < x * i < 1/2. The dynamics for y i are then given by
where the coefficients c ji are defined as
Following this fact, we define an infinitesimal stochastic matrix A(x) = a ij (x) ij as follows: for i = j, set
The diagonal entries of A(x) are determined by the condition that rows of A(x) sum to zero. Then, system (13) can be expressed as
We describe below some relevant facts about the matrix A(x). Note that if x ∈ Q, then
This, in particular, implies that there exists a lower bound δ > 0 such that
We say that a graph G x = (V, E x ) is induced by A(x) if the edge set E x satisfies the following condition: an edge i → j is in E x if and only if a ij (x) > 0. Define a graph G = (V, E) by reversing the edges of G, i.e., i → j is in E if and only if j → i is in E. Since G is strongly connected, so is the graph G. Moreover, we have that
Now, pick an initial condition x(0) ∈ Q, and from Corollary 2, x(t) is in Q for all t ≥ 0. Then, the ysystem (14) can be viewed as a time-varying linear system, with A(x(t)) (or simply A(t)) the time-varying matrix:
indeed, note that A(t) is an infinitesimal stochastic matrix, and hence the y-system above is nothing but a time-varying linear consensus process, with G = (V, E) the underlying network topology. Since G is strongly connected, and the entries a ij (t), for i → j ∈ E, are bounded below by δ for all t ≥ 0, we know from [21] that the transition matrix Φ(t) associated with A(t) converges to a rank-one matrix:
Hence, the trajectory of y(t) converges to a consensus state:
The convergence of y(t) implies the convergence of x(t).
Since there is only one equilibrium x * inside Q, we conclude that x(∞) = x * .
To establish Theorem 1, it now suffices to establish the following fact:
Proposition 5. The non-vertex equilibrium x * is exponentially stable.
Proof. Let J(x * ) be the Jacobian of the vector field f (x) at x * , i.e., J(x * ) := ∂ f (x * )/∂x. Then, by computation, we get
Since x * i < 1/2 for all i ∈ V, the diagonal matrix (I − 2X * ) has positive diagonal entries. It then follows that the matrix J(x * ) is an irreducible, infinitesimal stochastic matrix, and hence, has only one simple zero eigenvalue while all the other eigenvalues have negative real parts. Define a linear subspace of R n as
and note that T can be viewed as the tangent space of any point x in Sp[V]. Note that J(x * ) 1 = 0, and hence, T is invariant under J(x * ), i.e., for any vector v ∈ T, we have that J(x * )v ∈ T. So then, all the eigenvalues of J(x * ) have negative real parts when restricted to T, which implies that x * is exponentially stable.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The first part follows from Proposition 1. The second part follows from Propositions 2 and 5, and Corollary 1. The last part follows from Corollary 2 and Proposition 4.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a continuous-time selfappraisal model whereby a number of agents in a social network are able to evaluate their self-appraisals over time in a distributed way. We have shown that there is a unique stable equilibrium x * , and for almost all initial conditions, the trajectory converges to x * . Also, we have shown that under Assumption 1, each x * i is less than one half, meaning that in the steady state, there does not exist an agent whose self-appraisal dominates over the sum of the others.
Future work may focus on the case where each c ij is time-varying. For example, we can assume that each c ij also depends on the self-appraisal of x j , then how much opinion agent i accepts from agent j will depend on how influential agent j is in the social network. Also, note that this model can be developed into many other interesting problems. For example, a question related to optimal control is to assume that there is an agent i who is able to manipulate his own weights c ij , and we ask whether there is a choice of these weights so that self-appraisal of agent i is maximized? If further, we assume that there are multiple such players each of which is trying to maximize his own self-appraisal, then what would be the strategy for each of the players to choose the c ij ? This list of examples indicates that the self-appraisal model has a rich structure, and can be investigated under various assumptions and from various perspectives.
